I find that a great deal of the arguments against the Thomistic notion of Simplicity fail to actually uphold the non-compositional nature of God in their collapse argument. Subordinating, for example, will to knowledge. That just demonstrates a failure to integrate the actual doctrine and amounts to a strawman
Hey Fr Chris! It’s Dustin lol. This was a great post from Gregory wasn’t it? I’d love to catch up with you one of these days over a cigar and talk classical theism!
This was amazingly helpful, and as an Orthodox Jew I wonder if Maimonides who obviously held of divine simplicity in what seems to me a radical form would view it the same way. This was absolutely brilliant, thank you!
Excellent work connecting St. Maximos to a solution to modal collapse.
It seems to me that (E) involves a rigid designation of God's act of creation. While it makes some sense to say "actuality" rigidly designates from the side of creation to creator (the real relation), it is list clear to me that "actuality" rigidly designates our particular actual world from the side of creator to creature (the relation of reason). To me, it would be a non-rigid, as Kment describes, i.e. for any given world, the actual act of creation just is what is actual relative to that world. For the argument to be both valid and cause collapse, it seems to me that God's actual act of creation has to name our actuality as the actual act of creation across all possible worlds. But it does not make sense to me that, in some possible world, the actual act of creation that designates our actuality is the act of creation of that world as well. It isn't, so I think "actual act of creation" has to be non-rigid from the perspective of a God who transcends all possible worlds.
Thank you so much for citing my work and engaging with Islamic Neoplatonism. I read your critique of the Islamic necessitarian position but I am not sure I track the real or actual problem if you were trying to point one out.
Your critique also ignores (perhaps purposely given your broad focus on a lit review here) that the Islamic Neoplatonism model of God has the necessary creation proceeding hierarchically starting with the First Intellect (perfect creation) and ending with the physical world (most imperfect creation). So what God creates directly IS a perfect creation and obviously, God cannot create another God (who is as perfect as Him) because whatever God creates will lack aseity by necessity.
I find that a great deal of the arguments against the Thomistic notion of Simplicity fail to actually uphold the non-compositional nature of God in their collapse argument. Subordinating, for example, will to knowledge. That just demonstrates a failure to integrate the actual doctrine and amounts to a strawman
Hey Fr Chris! It’s Dustin lol. This was a great post from Gregory wasn’t it? I’d love to catch up with you one of these days over a cigar and talk classical theism!
This was amazingly helpful, and as an Orthodox Jew I wonder if Maimonides who obviously held of divine simplicity in what seems to me a radical form would view it the same way. This was absolutely brilliant, thank you!
Thank you for your kind words!
I'm not familiar enough with the thought of Maimonides to give an educated opinion either way, I'm afraid.
Hi, I systematically deal with this issue here, would love your feedback: https://robertdryer.com/defending-divine-simplicity/does-hyperintensionality-challenge-divine-simplicity/
Excellent work connecting St. Maximos to a solution to modal collapse.
It seems to me that (E) involves a rigid designation of God's act of creation. While it makes some sense to say "actuality" rigidly designates from the side of creation to creator (the real relation), it is list clear to me that "actuality" rigidly designates our particular actual world from the side of creator to creature (the relation of reason). To me, it would be a non-rigid, as Kment describes, i.e. for any given world, the actual act of creation just is what is actual relative to that world. For the argument to be both valid and cause collapse, it seems to me that God's actual act of creation has to name our actuality as the actual act of creation across all possible worlds. But it does not make sense to me that, in some possible world, the actual act of creation that designates our actuality is the act of creation of that world as well. It isn't, so I think "actual act of creation" has to be non-rigid from the perspective of a God who transcends all possible worlds.
At any rate, there is much to chew on here.
Thank you for all your encouragement!
Thank you so much for citing my work and engaging with Islamic Neoplatonism. I read your critique of the Islamic necessitarian position but I am not sure I track the real or actual problem if you were trying to point one out.
Your critique also ignores (perhaps purposely given your broad focus on a lit review here) that the Islamic Neoplatonism model of God has the necessary creation proceeding hierarchically starting with the First Intellect (perfect creation) and ending with the physical world (most imperfect creation). So what God creates directly IS a perfect creation and obviously, God cannot create another God (who is as perfect as Him) because whatever God creates will lack aseity by necessity.
I have explained how Islamic Neoplatonism can account for the problem of evil and thus the existence of an imperfect universe in this article: https://www.academia.edu/92920186/Necessitated_Evil_An_Islamic_Neoplatonic_Theodicy_from_the_Ismaili_Tradition_Contemporary_Islamic_Thinkers_on_Evil_Suffering_and_the_Global_Pandemic
In any case thank you for recognizing my contribution to this debate and keep up the good work.